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Summary
Website presentation is becoming a crucial issue as more and more services of all
different kinds are offered by more and more content providers to a rapidly growing
audience on the Internet. In the face of accelerated competition and intransparency
it is highly important for a service provider to present himself with an appealing
and professionally designed website. To attract the attention of as many Internet
surfers as possible and to raise their curiosity and interest, service providers will
have to do everything to enhance their website’s traffic and to transform casual
visitors into habitual customers and partners. In order to attract more traffic, link-
ages directing the user from website to website is a crucial issue and building-up
strategic linkage liaisons with other website owners on a B2B basis will be one
of the future key elements of successful website presentation. Linkage liaisons
between websites will give rise to emergent network structures (professional and
non-professional) as well as to all sorts of minor and major linkage conflicts that
arise among website owners (or their agents) in the course of incrementally en-
gaging in building up new linkages and deleting old ones. Hence, linkage liaisons
look like a particularly suitable scenario for designing, implementing, and testing
models for real world applications and for scientific research purposes of compar-
ing interactionism with social systems approaches in sociology. We assume that
liaison models differ from more conventional DAI applications not only because
they operate on a permanent basis (cf. computational ecology) and that they pro-
duce, reproduce and modify an ”emergent” social structure while resolving (or not
resolving!) conflictive episodes. The presumed advantages of the proposed model,
both from a software engineering and from a sociological perspective, should be
seen in the way that a linkage networks would have to meet the demands of shifting
from a highly efficient and cost saving routine mode into a resource consumptive
conflict mode and back again into a new routine mode after the conflict has been
settled. In other words: the system should be able to learn from conflicts and, in
doing so, an agent society would operate like a self-organising mechanism or a
selfsustaining general purpose infrastructure.
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1 Introduction
Website presentation is becoming a crucial issue as more and more services of all
different kinds are offered by more and more content providers to a rapidly growing
audience on the Internet. In the face of accelerated competition and intransparency
it is highly important for a service provider to present himself with an appealing
and professionally designed website. To attract the attention of as many Internet
surfers as possible and to raise their curiosity and interest, service providers will
have to do everything to enhance their website’s traffic and to transform casual vis-
itors into habitual customers and partners. But what makes a website presentation
attractive and what can one do to improve a presentation? A new market segment
is emerging in the service sectors for professional website consultants: website
design and, more recently, website rating. In response to the growing demands,
many thousands of websites designers and marketing consultants are on their way
to help all those who have a trade to ply on the Internet and WWW. However, a
professional website presentation alone will not do. In order to attract more Inter-
net traffic – and traffic means business! – it would be useful to know more about
the surfing behaviour of Internet users in general and specifically about the routes
they select. Here, market research studies for website ratings and rankings might
be revealing.
However, empirical information will not be all that revealing. It would largely
confirm what we already know, namely that users, apart from using search engines
as the most common point of entry to the WWW, also will look for interesting links
they can find on those websites they have been directed to by their search machine:
[Rogers, 2000] By means of website linkages which connect one site with another
one, users will autonomously be capable of surfing from one website to another to
find and select similar or related content elsewhere. Hence, linkages directing the
user from website to website is a crucial issue and building-up strategic linkage
liaisons with other website owners on a B2B basis will be one of the future key
elements of successful website presentation. Linkage liaisons between websites
will give rise to emergent network structures (professional and non-professional)
as well as to all sorts of minor and major linkage conflicts that arise among website
owners (or their agents) in the course of incrementally engaging in building up new
linkages and deleting old ones.
Hence, linkage liaisons look like a particularly suitable scenario for designing,
implementing, and testing CONSTRUCT (Conflict and Structure) models for real
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world applications and for scientific research purposes of comparing interaction-
ism with social systems approaches in sociology. The linkage liaison scenario is
specifically attractive for CONSTRUCTNETWORK models out of the following six
reasons:
1. It is a quasi natural scenario of website rating and a real life process occurring
in front of our eyes in the WWW and Internet, and hence far more realistic
than any sort of website ranking done by a jury of ”artificial” experts and
published in the media. Instead, the ”real” experts are the website owners
themselves who, by the very fact of having decided to link their website to
another one, de facto have given a positive rating.
2. In the linkage liaison scenario an agent is defined as an active website rep-
resenting and acting on behalf of its owner. To begin with, specific agent
roles for web-search or Internet ”trawling” or for rating and ranking are not
needed. Thus, unnecessary complications can be avoided in a prototypical
implementation.
3. The basic prerogative of agents consists of attracting as much attention and
traffic as possible by means of exchanging linkages with influential partners
and, hence, to improve their public standing. This seems to be perfectly in
line with the practical behaviour of real empirical website owners.
4. In a short-term perspective we seem to be faced with a clear-cut engineering
task: As linkage negotiations (or linkage conflicts) are specified as local
events or as episodic ”encounters” (or pseudo ”face-to-face” interactions)
which terminate in a yes/no decision, they should be, at least in principle,
computable.
5. In a global or long-term perspective, however, the scenario confronts the
designers with a quasi endless process of reproduction and permanent struc-
tural modulation, i.e. with a ”living”, self-evolving network of linkages –
and one of the design problems will consist of ”synchronising” the different
time-scales of short term conflicts and long-term structuration.
6. Moreover, as a ”real life” phenomenon under empirical sociological obser-
vation, linkage liaisons on the Internet offer the opportunity to run compu-
tational simulation experiments of interesting sociological issues like power
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distribution, social unequality, democratic control, coalition formation and
the evolution of ”structures” like frames or generalised media of interaction.
Excursion 1: A conflict scenario in a subcultural network
community
Before we begin to outline how to derive ”structure from conflict” bottom-up, it
might be useful to give an illustration of a real life scenario of network communi-
ties. The illustration is, as all ideas in this paper, still very preliminary. So consider-
able social research work (qualitative case studies based on interviews, documents
and other materials, quantitative statistical analyses) will have to be invested to
gain a profounder empirical understanding of real life linkage liaisons on the In-
ternet as a basis to improve our models and architectures. Generally speaking, a
real life linkage scenario could be conceived as a loosely coupled network commu-
nity with ill-defined system boundaries and fluctuating participants embedded in
the communication infrastructures of WWW and Internet. To illustrate the idea of
what ”structural change” could mean, let us take as an example a non-professional
community of young people organising open air (Goa) parties1 by making use
of informal acquaintance connections via the Internet and WWW. Perhaps in the
beginning just a handful of non-professional individuals who share a specific com-
mitment to subcultural values (e.g. postmaterialistic values of ”flower power”) have
linked their websites to organise and celebrate parties and performances and to
have fun together. As the parties attract more and more people and money, a more
professional management is required to sustain what turns out to have become a
flourishing business with growing scales of investment and profit. Hence, a grad-
ual shift takes place that may give rise to conflicts between ”traditionalists” (who
stick to a subcultural life style of spontaneous anarchy) and ”professionals” (who
wish introduce new professional standards of website design, business promotion,
obligations and membership).
At first, the conflict will begin to develop on a low level of bilateral interactions (A
versus B etc.). And it is not at all clear that there is a general underlying conflict
between two different value orientations (commercial versus subcultural) lurging
1Other examples may be more compelling or suitable and should be selected out of a multitude
of newsgroups for leisure and fun or for professional purposes or for hobbies, networks for business
among enterprises (B2B) or networks of business to customer relations (B2C).[Kumar et al., 1999]
7
beneath a multitude of minor disputes. For an empirical sociological investiga-
tion it would be interesting to study how a network community gradually becomes
aware of the more general dimensions and explicitly symbolises low level conflict
as indicators of a collective (high level) conflict. Once a general awareness of a
high level value conflict has developed within the community, the conflict may
be defined as follows: The ”professionals” feel disturbed and inhibited in their
business prospects by the ”traditionalists” who adhere to their ”postmaterialistic”
practices of unreliability, nonchalance and neglect of commitments (e.g. A has
”forgotten” his promise to announce B’s next performance on his website, while
B has faithfully advertised A’s new Jogi-tea sortiment). A is frustrated because
the network propaganda had badly failed to spread and advertise his ”performance
info”. As it seems, informality does not work satisfactorily and common subcul-
tural values do not sufficiently frame and integrate the community’s identity any
longer. The ”traditionalists”, on the other hand, have an innate aversion against
formal rules and ”professional” restrictions because they identify themselves with
openness and spontaneity and are suspicious of all kinds of business entrepreneurs
who claim to be part of their community. Professionals are suspected of oppor-
tunistically abusing the subcultural community as a convenient market place for
commercial interests. Traditionalists feel deeply threatened by excessive commer-
cialisation and do not wish to be part of a formal network with strict reciprocity
norms and binding obligations. In the course of conflict escalation the community
network may split up into two different networks, i.e. most traditionalists delete
their linkage liaisons to professionalists and vice versa. Thus, the conflict seems to
be resolved by segregation.
At this point there are many more questions2 waiting for an answer, but we shall
concentrate on just one of them: What happens if both communities feel that find-
ing a compromise is better than ”solving” the conflict by segregation? They will
2Which of the two subcommunities is going to survive? Will the professionalists loose their sub-
cultural roots and their traditional ”customers”, will they be out-manoeuvered by bigger commercial
players? Will the traditionalists be able to cultivate a niche market or will they starve from a loss
of subcultural entrepreneurship? Perhaps the conflict parties are able to anticipate these dangers of
segregation and find a way to coexist which is more beneficial with both sides. Indeed, segregation
is just one possible outcome of conflict. Another way of coping with such conflicts could be seen in
the emergence of proto-legal institutions for mediation and ”due process”, by giving the network a
more formalised structure, or by making collective values more explicit and transforming them into
norms. An implementation would humbly have to concentrate on just one of these aspects.
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have to draw on institutions of dispute mediation and generally expected standards
of argumentation. But what if such institutions do not exist? They will have to
invent it. And when we look at behavioural norms in newsgroups (”netiquette”),
it is not really unlike that more such institutions will be created in the course of
future Internet developments.
2 Bottom-up instead of top-down?
We want to outline some basic principles for a dynamically evolving network of
linkage liaisons with a limited number of agents which are free to say ”no” to each
others prompts and suggestions. In the following sections a ”bottom-up” approach
will be suggested for the construction of linkage liaisons via conflict communi-
cation. In order to avoid all unnecessary complications we will rigorously try to
abstract from most of those technical features that would be needed to engineer
a useful real life application: no scalability, no user interface, no mobile agents
for web search, no communication facilities apart from those which are absolutely
necessary to establish bilateral links, and agents equipped with as little knowledge
and inferential power as necessary. In other words:
1. It is (unrealistically) presupposed that difficult problems like finding poten-
tial partners on the Internet (by matchmaking, agent mobility etc.) have
already been successfully solved.
2. It is (unrealistically) presupposed that there are further mechanisms to sup-
port everyday communication and exchange among the website owners (sin-
ce linkage liaisons have, of course, no end in themselves and serve as an
infrastructure for some practical tasks).
3. And it is (unrealistically) assumed that agents know the preferences of their
website owners or will be – at least – supplied by their owners with situated
criteria or detailed instructions of how and when to engage (or disengage) in
linkage liaisons. All these crucial issues will be excluded from our model.
In heroically neglecting most of these issues, we will try to consequentially keep
track with a bottom-up approach: Apart from introducing a small set of predefined
communication primitives, ”everything else” should be automatically generated by
the system itself – or to put it more modestly: with as little help and input from the
”outside” (by a designer, a user, a databank, an external knowledge base etc.) as
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possible. Instead, all of the more powerful sociological concepts (social structures)
like expectations, frames, conventions, roles, commitments etc. should be produced
by the artificial social system itself in a sort of self-referential (or recursive) pro-
cess of ”emergent” self-production and self-modification. Of course we know that
this is quite unfeasible and many good reasons and a lot of practical difficulties
do indeed suggest that we should adopt a combined bottom-up and top-down ap-
proach. One of the most crushing theoretical objections against ”bottom-up” is that
designing an evolutionary artificial social system out of a few communications or
actions is self refuting because the designer cannot really abstain from a general
”top-down” vision of what his (!) system eventually should do. We suspect that this
is as right as it is wrong. From a software engineering perspective such objections
are correct because a pure bottom-up approach is technically unfeasible anyway.
On the other hand, it is clear that system designers secretly dream the dream of an
elegant, intelligent, bottom-up system design that solves a maximum of problems
with just a minimum of predefined mechanisms.
But what about sociology? How would sociologists respond to the question? A
bottom-up approach to system design appears to be in line with sociological theo-
ries of social action which suggest that social structures consist of nothing else but
of repeated interaction and that structures cannot be adequately understood unless
they are reconstructed from the bottom-up perspective of participant interaction
as social practices.3 Hence, for heuristic purposes we try to follow a bottom-up-
design as faithfully and as rigorously as possible, hoping to gain some instructive
insights from happily failing to push the approach to its limits.
3Of course, other sociological theories hold that communications are elements of social systems
and as such they cannot be isolated and do not have an independent existence on their own. Fol-
lowing Luhmann [Luhmann, 1984, Luhmann, 1990], for instance, should we then have to construct
an artificial social system from ”top down”? Not necessarily, says Luhmann, since system design is
not limited to any specific approach and reconstructing a social system could begin almost arbitrarily
from almost anywhere. But once we have decided how to begin, we are no longer free to proceed
arbitrarily but must stick to our design decision with high fidelity for the sake of consistency and
coherence, says Luhmann.
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3 Defining a basic set of (inter)action primitives
First of all a set of primitives along the lines of KQML-like [Finin et al., 1997,
KQML, 1999] speech acts4 will be defined, each of which is framed by a sender
and addressee A,B,C,D, . . . The agents A,B,C etc. can insert or delete links
on their own website only and they are restricted to a ”myopic” frog eyes’ per-
spective and they share no global knowledge of the overall network structure. The
communication primitives are given in the following list:
1. insert link(action: insert a link on ones own website to point out to another
website: insertLink(A,B))
2. delete link (action: delete a link: deleteLink(A,B))
3. check link (action: checking a link on a website: check(A,B))
4. reason (action: inference of inserting or deleting a link:
reason(A, insertLink(A,B)))
5. request (communication: contains (inter)actions:
request(A,B, check(A,C)))
6. accept (communication: contains (inter)actions:
accept(A,B, insertLink(A,C)))
7. reject (communication: contains (inter)actions:
reject(A,B, deleteLink(B,C)))
8. announce (communication: contains future (inter)actions:
announce(A,B, object(A,C, insertLink(C,B))))
9. tell (communication: contains past (inter)actions:
tell(A,B, request(A,C, insertLink(C,B)))
”insertLink” and ”deleteLink” are indirect, asynchronous messages, since they can
be received or observed by way of checking linkages on other websites. Thus,
4Note a decisive difference between our action and communication primitives and KQML-speech
acts: while the latter use to trigger some kind of automated response in the recipient, the communi-
cation primitives suggested here do not impose a specific restriction to agent autonomy. Anything
goes? If this is the case, will our scenario be chaotic and non-computational?
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checking a website is equivalent to reading a binary-coded message from a mail-
box or a blackboard: either there is a link to a particular website or there is none. In
contrast, the action types ”check” and ”reason” are purely cognitive, i.e. unobserv-
able by others. ”Reason” is a selectional operation based on information an agent
has been told by another one or which he has gained by ”checking” another web-
site. Both ”check” and ”reason” as such are unobservable by others (”arms-length
relationships”: no sharing of personal knowledge). They are no communications or
messages, because they does not leave any traces behind which could be observed
or read by another agent later on5. However, ”check” and ”reason” can be read as
the informational content of a message if included into one of the five direct (syn-
chronous or asynchronous) message types ”request”, ”reject”, ”announce”, and
”tell”.
Note that the situational meaning of these primitives may be varying sharply ac-
cording to different circumstances. For instance, ”announce” can express a hostile
warning (announce(A,B, deleteLink(A,B))) as well as a friendly offer
(announce(A,B, insertLink(A,B))). Furthermore, depending on the addressee’s
interpretation or point of view, a warning can occasionally be interpreted as good
news because it will allow an agent, in the course of events, to get rid of some
unwanted linkages. Or an offer can be interpreted as bad news because it means
trouble if the addressee is not interested in exchanging links with the sender! This
seems to complicate the model far beyond computational feasibility. And the ques-
tion is how to implement technically useful and sociologically adequate restric-
tions or rules that help to channel an agents freedom of selecting whatever makes
sense to him. From a human societies point of view, however, there is no need to
worry too much about agents’ internal or mental states, communicative selections,
meaningful reactions etc. since it will be enough to observe how they observe each
others’ communications or interactions.
What we will have to find out in the following sections is whether it is (computa-
tionally and sociologically) feasible to model a more complex scenario of conflict
processing which is based on not more than nine types of interaction. With our
previously given definitions of (inter)action primitives we hopefully will be able to
model (and eventually implement and simulate) the conflict dynamics and struc-
5Perhaps it is more realistic to assume that ”check” could be conceived as an indirect message to
the website owner in case that owners are able to read the identity of visitors?
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turation of a distributed network of loosely coupled liaisons among ”active” web-
sites. This includes the formation and disintegration of communities, of asymmet-
ric power relationships, and of a diversity of mechanisms for conflict regulation,
third party intervention and ”due process”.
4 Routine mode and conflict mode
Routine mode: In the routine mode we begin with a simple network of website-
links with different patterns of references and relationships (symmetric, asymmet-
ric, loosely coupled, strictly coupled etc.). For an illustration let us consider an
agent A who wishes to join the network and inscribes on his own website a link
to B’s website (insertLink)(A,B)) while deleting a link to C (deleteLink(A,C))
whom he does or does not inform about the deletion, according to pure conve-
nience, neglect and the like.6 Then he proudly presents himself to B as someone
who has beneficially linked toB’s website (tell(A,B, insertLink(A,B))). Whether
B will be flattered, bored, pested or uninterested: A’s offer is not just a constative
information but also a performative message, namely an indirect or implicit re-
quest to exchange links, i.e. appeals to B to link his website to A’s. B understands,
i.e. we assume that he is able to distinguish between information and message, al-
though, in our example, he does not display any overt reaction7. Later on A checks
B’s website (check(A,B)) and he finds no link referring to his own. A is not re-
ally disappointed (individual inhibition) because he had not actually expected to
find himself acknowledged by B (who happens to be one of the more influential
members of the network community), and so he continues to look for some other
website-agent to exchange links with. Or it happens that he unexpectedly finds a
positive answer (agree(B,A, insertLink(A,B))) in his mailbox and a link on B’s
website . . . and soon A expresses his gratitude by telling B that he is going to send
a request to some of his own acquaintances (we assume that a function acq(A)
6It would conform to Goffman’s interaction order[Goffman, 1983] to introduce an unquestioned
convention that any action must be politely reported to whom it may concern. However, with regard
to computational resources this would raise communication costs tremendously. From a sociolog-
ical point of view we should distinguish between the conventions of face-to-face interaction and
anonymous communication on the Internet.
7This comes quite close to Luhmann’s definition of the operation called ”Verstehen” as drawing
a distinction between information and message. The concept may be interpreted to give complete
autonomy to the agents and here is a crucial difference to KQML speech acts, which do not allow
any message to remain unanswered.
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returns a list of all agents agent A knows) to inscribe links to B’s website:
∀X ∈ acq(A).tell(A,B, request(A,X, insertLink(X,B))).
Meanwhile, many other agents inscribe and delete many other links, concurrently
and at different times, and subsequently the network is in permanent evolutionary
change. But is this the emergent social structure we are looking for? No, we are
looking for the impact of conflicts on structure (and vice versa).
Conflict mode: An interactant A wishes to join the network and inscribes on his
own website a link to B’s website (insertLink(A,B)). Then he presents his link to
B (tell(A,B, insertLink(A,B))). B does not react neither explicitly nor implicitly,
even after days A cannot find a respective link on B’s website (check(A,B)). A
doesn’t give up and kindly but explicitly asks B to do him the favour of reciprocity
(request(A,B, insertLink(B,A))). At this point of interactionB (as an adherent to
Goffman’s rules of social intercourse) should be sufficiently motivated to answer
A’s request. But still B remains silent. A has to face the fact that B ignores his
request which – in psychological terms – is more humiliating than a plain rejection.
But neither rejection nor ignorance (reject(B,A, request(A,B, insertLink(B,A))))8
is a conflict. Instead, an interagent conflict begins to emerge as a conflict only when
A declares his discontent in an unambiguous manner, either by asking B to give
reasons for his rejection (request(A,B, reason(B, reject(insertLink(B,A))))) or
by simply insisting on his request (i.e. repeating it), or, according to Luhmann’s
definition of a conflict communication, by explicitly rejecting B’s rejection
reject(A,B, reject(B,A, request(A,B, insertLink(B,A))))
or by spelling out a warning (announce(A,B, deleteLink(A,B))). We have an
outspoken, meaningful dissent now – or a symbolically constituted social object.
In other words: Both agents no longer can define the situation as a routine case
but will have to realise that an established routine of networking has broken down
8We hopefully need not define an action ”ignore” because we assume that this is implied by
”reject”. However, this issue is rather touchy and must be decided along with the question how to
implement temporality (cf. Kai Lorentzen & Mathias Nickles on ”Ordnung aus Chaos”). Do five
minutes of silence have to be interpreted as ”ignorance”, hence as an ”implicit rejection”? And
what happens when a positive reply (BtellA(BinsertLinkA)) arrives seven minutes after A’s original
request and one minute after A has launched a counter-attack? He might, out of sheer impatience,
just have spoilt the beginning of a wonderful friendship!
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and they will probably follow up the coming events with growing awareness or
concern! Or what is more likely, A’s announcement just has no consequences and
the conflict remains an episode and just dissolves.
5 A simple interagent conflict and its dissolution
1. insertLink(A,B)
2. tell(A,B, insertLink(A,B))
3. request(A,B, insertLink(B,A))
4. reject(B,A, request(A,B, insertLink(B,A)))
5. request(A,B, reason(B, reject(B,A, insertLink(B,A))))
6. reject(A,B, reject(A,B, request(A,B, insertLink(B,A))))
⇒ double rejection: this is the conflict point!
7. announce(A,B, deleteLink(A,B))
Excursion 2: Emergent conventions?
More interesting, perhaps, is the case of an agent C raising an objection9 against B
(with whom he entertains a linkage liaison) exchanging also linkages withA. What
happens afterC has found out (by check or tell) thatB has exchanged linkages with
A, is that Cspells out a warning to delete his link to B, unless B deletes his link to
A (or unless A refrains from realising his announcement):
announce(C,B,¬deleteLink(B,A)⇒ deleteLink(C,B)).
”If you don’t break off (or refrain from taking up) linkage liaisons with A, I will
break off my relationship with you!” This is somehow similar to a wedding an-
nouncement’s function to prevent bigamy – the difference being, of course, that
there is not law or convention that prohibits any linkage liaisons. In the contrary,
9We might consider to distinguish a ”rejection” (against interactions directly concerning an agent)
from an ”objection” (against third-party interactions indirectly concerning an agent). But introducing
a new primitive ”object” would mean to raise unnecessary complications.
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such kind of warning must be considered as an illegitimate interference into an-
other agent’s ”liberty of linkage”, definitely a rather modern concept of social life.
However, later on we should take keen interest in demonstrating how a convention
that regulates (restricts and at the same time: enables!) linkage liaisons could
emerge or be learnt in the course of network evolution, either by deliberation or by
adaptation.
Excursion 3: Global knowledge by self-design?
Similarly we must ask whether we must explicitly design a mechanism for auto-
matically publishing or advertising any linkage proposal etc. on a blackboard? Or
is our model scenario so charming because agents do have incomplete information
about other networking (inter)activities? This comes close to pragmatically ”situ-
ated” knowledge: Usually there is no pressing need and no motivation to acquire
knowledge about something, which is of no immediate concern for oneself, even
if it is not impossible to obtain the information. Although ”check” is an activity
that virtually enables any agent to gather information about the liaison structure in
laboriously working his way from website to website, it is practically unfeasible
to obtain a global overview of the entire structure because it would take too much
effort to search through the endlessly ramifying branches of a search tree. There-
fore, at some very early point of up-scaling, there will be an ever pressing need
for ”global knowledge” in form of yellow pages: Is this a designers task or is it
feasible to implement a collective learning process which enables an agent society
to self-design its own blackboard? So, allowing agents to have access to ”global
knowledge” is not the same as to provide them with the capacity to control ”global
knowledge”. From the frog’s eye perspective of a network participant it is only
possible to understand one’s immediate ”acquaintance structure”.
6 From interagent to collective conflicts
After a conflict has been explicitly declared by a double rejection and an announce-
ment to delete a previously offered link, A has three options to continue the conflict
communication on an interagent level and a fourth option to raise the conflict:
1. A may realise his warning and actually do what he had already announced
before by actually deleting his link to B’s website again (deleteLink(A,B)).
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This may be called an ”entropic” option because its consequence is network
destructuration.
2. A may do nothing. Warning need not be followed by sanction. A zone of
uncertainty10 is established and the conflict impends – or as time goes by,
evolves out of existence. There remains, however, an interesting side-effect
which deserves closer investigation as A maintains his link to B but B does
has no link referring to A’s website: an uneven or asymmetric relationship!
3. A may continue to molest B with permanent requests hoping that B eventu-
ally will give in and finally agree (or B will take countermeasures to get rid
of what he must conceive as a pest).
4. Or A may ask other agents to interfere on A’s behalf and to persuade or
convince B or to build up social pressure on him thus raising the conflict on
a collective level.
A may turn to others (third party agents X ∈ acq(A)) for an intervention on A’s
behalf, ultimately to coerce B back on the right track. The conflict escalates. . . To
insert some ”social-world realism” into our scenario, it can be assumed that further
steps of gradually up-scaling the conflict can be taken. On the basis of broadcast-
ing his case to a broader public of network participants and to invite others to take
collective action against B, A continues to escalate his conflict with B by includ-
ing others (third party agents). By taking the following ”indirect” measures, an
interagent conflict will be gradually transformed into a collective conflict:
a. The first thing for A to do is to spell out a warning to B that A will bring the
case to other networking agents:
announce(A,B,∀X ∈ acq(A).tell(A,X, reject(A,B, insertLink(B,A))))
b. A publishes the issue at stake by actually telling other agents, his acquain-
tances, about his conflict with B:
∀X ∈ acq(A).tell(A,X, reject(A,B, insertLink(B,A)))
10B might assume that she had been scared by an empty threat or unfounded menace – but she
can never be sure. Those who have followed up the research work on commitments or persistent
intentions (Cohen & Levesque 1990) will know how tricky it is to provide agents with an option of
”de-committing” themselves in a feasible and implementable way!
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c. Moreover A may want to bring his case to a broader public by asking oth-
ers to broadcast11 to their acquaintances whom he does not know: ∀X ∈
acq(A), A issues the message
request(A,X,∀Y ∈ acq(X).tell(X,Y, reject(B,A, insertLink(B,A))))
After having informed the public (not the public opinion: that comes later), A
continues to mobilise other agents and to build up more collective pressure on B
by asking the others to intervene onA’s behalf (who become ”supporters” by doing
so) up to the point where A’s supporters collectively exclude B from the network
(more precisely: from their particular networking segment)
d. A asks others to intervene on his behalf and to persuade B to exchange links
with A:
∀X ∈ acq(A).request(A,X, request(X,B, (insertLink(B,A))))
e. A asks others to warn B to exclude him from the network, unless he does
what they want him to do:
∀X ∈ acq(A).request(A,X, announce(X,B, deleteLink(X,B)))
f. A’s ultima ratio is to ask others to sanction B by practically excluding him
from the network: ∀X ∈ acq(A).request(A,X, deleteLink(X,B))
g. The others follow A’s request and exclude B from the network by deleting
their respective linkages: ∀X ∈ acq(A).deleteLink(X,B)
Again, if the others do not follow A’s suggestion and do not exclude B from the
network (deleteLink(X,B)), the conflict is resolved in favour of B and to the dis-
advantage of A. However, their are more options impending. B will probably not
11Here we could introduce a more powerful communicative act called ”broadcast”: an agent re-
questing all her acquaintances to send a specific message to all their acquaintances to send a spe-
cific message to all their acquaintances ad infinitum until everybody is informed. To make such a
compound-shortcut mechanism like ”broadcast” emerge from collective experience alias from rep-
etition, would it be convenient (and theoretically adequate?) to have a kind of connectionist (or
neural-net) operator which detects repetitive communications and integrates them into communica-
tion structures alias more powerful pieces of program code?
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remain calmly seated in his armchair and idly watch12 A’s activities in forming a
coalition against him. Instead of allowing all this to happen, B will begin to mo-
bilise his own cohorts in order to form a counter coalition. And in case that he is
able to succeed and effectively counterbalance A’s coalition forming activities, the
situation will appear to be highly explosive and threatening to the entire network
community.
The interesting question is: What will happen next? In a constellation of two
equally powerful coalitions opposing each other, there are at least three different
ways to continue a conflict process at the collective or societal level:
1. Nothing will happen and, instead, the conflict cools out by way of annealing
and will be soon forgotten (or stored in the collective memory of the network
participants)
2. The conflict escalates into a ”hot” war by someone13 making his threat (an-
nounce) come true (deleteLink), thus possibly triggering a chain reaction in
which the network community will be split up or differentiated14 into two
distinctive communities along the lines of previous coalition formation.
3. The conflict is stalemated because both coalitions are equally powerful and
nobody wishes to run the incalculable risks of a hot conflict. At this point
the conflict parties (or any other agent) can try (if it is not too late) to reframe
conflict communication as a forum for ”due process”.
12 To what extent do we have to assume that A and B are able to ”observe” each others activities?
A consistent ”interactionist” perspective would have to restrict an agent’s ”local” knowledge about
network activities only to those interactions in which he is directly participating or in which he is
indirectly participating through other agents directly informing him about their interactions with
third agents. In any case none of these agents should be endowed with ”global” knowledge, i.e with
a capability to monitor the entire network activities.
13Anyone? That would leave the coming events to all sorts of hazards which is certainly far too
dangerous at a point of escalation where the whole network community is involved and potentially
effected. So we would have to assume some kind of core agent (commander in chief) who acts
on behalf of his coalition and controls switching from cold to hot war. And if so: do we have to
predefine the role of a commander or is such a role to be conceived as the emergent outcome of
previous interactions?
14Differentiation according to Luhmann’s theoretical concept of segmentary or functional differen-
tiation? Here we should follow up the question whether linkage conflicts might also foster functional
differentiation along the lines of generalised media: e.g. one linkage network beginning to operate
on a monetary code and the other on a code of subcultural value commitments. See below.
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7 Forums for argumentation and mediation
Essentially both conflict parties will come to the point where they will either have
to make their warnings come true or they will have to reframe the conflict set-
ting into ”due process”, by inviting each other to renegotiate their case with the
assistance of an impartial mediator. In the former case the network will probably
undergo some drastic transformation and reorganise fundamentally by agents knit-
ting new ties and linkages and breaking down old ones (perhaps along the lines
of knowledge frames or generalised media?). However, since the scenario is em-
bedded in a real world social context of emergent network communities on the
Internet, the battlefield theatre that has been built up so far cannot really explode in
a destructive fight because the utmost harm agents are capable of inflicting on each
other is to break down interagent relationships. Indeed, as long as all agents have
a realistic exit option, deleting a linkage liaison is just everyday business and does
not appear to be a really harmful way of sanctioning someone. Furthermore, even
huge linkage conflicts may be channelled in a more ”peaceful” way. In the latter
case the scenario becomes far more complex because now reasons and arguments
must be given and agents will have to disclose their motives: As long as the conflict
parties do have complete freedom to take any time they need and since they do not
have to act or react automatically or immediately, nor unconsciously, there will be
no chain reaction triggered by any of the announcements, approvals or rejections.
Agents are able to revise their previous declarations at any time. And they do not
have to take action (insertLink, deleteLink, check, reason) just because they have
announced to do so. Thus, an agent can suspend and even dispense any announce-
ment at will. In such a highly contingent setting there is a need for implementing
two facilities:
1. To cope with contingency – both conflict parties are unable to oversee (no
global knowledge!) the consequences of ultimate conflict action (deleteLink)
– agents will have to handle the coming sequence of interwoven interactions
in a particularly cautious and thoughtful way. They must carefully reflect
what to do next before taking action in a potentially explosive situation. Such
”contingency awareness” – which might grow through experience gained in
a simulation experiment by repetition and accumulation, but must not be
confused with global knowledge! – opens up new avenues for reframing
a conflict scenario into a scenario of deliberation and argumentation (”due
process”), and even while hostile interaction is already going on.
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2. A ”due process” scenario (or forum) will have to reduce uncertainty and con-
tingency by introducing expectation-based roles like (i.) impartial agents or
mediators, (ii.) regulations and procedures for argumentation and delibera-
tion, and (iii.) binding or obliging decisions underpinned with commitments
and sanctions. With regard to our scenario of two emergent conflict coali-
tions we will assume that the conflict process has not entirely demolished
all available (social, moral?) resources of the network community and that
there are still enough impartial third party agents available who so far have
declined all invitations to join any of the emergent conflict coalitions. These
impartial agents may now play the role of mediators. When calling for a me-
diation process, the conflict parties as well as all other agents involved in the
procedure ultimately commit themselves to the outcome of the decision. A
due process scenario begins with the installation of a kind of proto-legal pro-
cedure and it terminates in a collective decision or a majority vote (a jury’s
verdict) by making use of argument and deliberation.
3. A conflict situation is transformed into due process when a conflict party (for
whatever reasons) calls for a mediation procedure and the other agrees. How-
ever, in our scenario any such procedure or institution (mediators, argumen-
tation, decision) does not exist so far. At this point it is just all too tempting
to implement a predefined ”social structure” (off-line design of roles, regu-
lations, decisions). However, this would be too easy. Our ambition is rather
to predefine as few concepts as possible and find out instead how far we can
get along with systematically applying the action primitive ”reason”. Up to
this point we have deliberately avoided to make practical use of ”reasons” –
with the exception of agent A asking B in our first example to give reasons
for his rejection, a request which was ignored by B. Now we change gears
by ”instructing” our agents to give and ask for reasons more frequently. This
”instruction” should be conceived as a collective learning process propelled
by ”inhibition” or, more exactly, by creative attempts to overcome an inhibi-
tion15 which agents have inflicted on each other. Agent societies should learn
to differentiate between contexts (Goffman: frame [Goffman, 1974], situa-
15Changing gears from the (1) low level of pre-conflictive ”inserting” and ”deleting” linkage li-
aisons to the (2) medium level of ”conflict communication” and from there to the (3) high level of
”reasoning communication” implies growing resource consumption (runtime, processing capacity,
memory, communication overhead etc.). Accordingly, agents should be able to switch between a
”routine mode” and a ”reflexive mode”.
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tional context) in which it is appropriate to overcome a conflict by ”reason
communication” (argumentation and deliberation about motives, interests,
consequences etc.) and contexts in which exchanging reasons would just
end up in a mess of even more deeply entrenched hostility (hence a waste of
computational and social resources).
In the following we will give a simple example of an agent C (already entertain-
ing a linkage liaison with agent B) who opposes against B’s announcement to
exchange linkages with A:
a. C spells out a warning to B in saying ”if you don’t break off (or refrain from
taking up) linkage liaisons with B, I will break off my linkage liaison with
you”:
announce(C,B,¬deleteLink(B,A)⇒ deleteLink(C,B)).
b. B ignores C’s warning and now C informs his acquaintances and asks them
to take collective action against B by excluding him from the network:
∀X ∈ acq(C).request(C,X, deleteLink(X,B))
.
c. However, instead of supporting or rejecting C’s case16 (as in the previous
example), acuaintance X will ask C to give reasons and justify why he does
not want B to exchange links with A, i.e.
∀X ∈ acq(C).request(X,C, reason(C, request(C,B, deleteLink(B,A))))
and they will also ask B to give his reasons.
d. C argues (1-) that A is providing the same kind of Internet service (evidence:
website content ”check”) as C and that C would not have a fair chance to
compete with a ”big player” likeA (evidence: A entertains ”foreign” linkage
liaisons with powerful partners outside the network):
∀X ∈ acq(C).tell(C,X, reason(C, deleteLink(B,A), 1−).
16Note that our agents just have invented the notion of ”impartiality”! Note also, however, that
they would never be able to invent anything unless we write a program that enables them to do so.
In other words: How is it possible to implement ”deviant variation” or ”creative invention” into a
program as a nucleus for evolution or emergent institutions?
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e. Meanwhile B sends a note to his acquaintances Y to inform them about
his conflict with C and about X’s request for reasons and invites them to a
general discussion17:
∀Y ∈ acq(B).request(B, Y, request(X,B, reason(B, insertLink(B,A))))
f. After acquaintances Y have accepted B’s invitation, B addresses all who are
involved now, including his prospective linkage liaison A, arguing (1+) that
competition is better for the network community than having a ”monopo-
list”; (3+) and that A is a gain for the network because he shares the network
values (evidence: A’s website content and that of some of his ”foreign” li-
aisons):
∀X ∈ acq(B)∪acq(C).tell(B,X, reason(B, insertLink(B,A), {1+, 3+})).
g. Now everybody begins to send arguments pro and contra, the debate is con-
fused and blurred by other agents trying to settle old scores, but before it
all ends up in a chaos, D (from C’s party) and M (from B’s party) sug-
gest to use D’s website as a common address to get the reasoning process
organised.18
h. The following discussion shows that a large majority is ready to follow B’s
reasons (1+,3+) because he argues from a general perspective of community
values whereas C argues from a rather particular perspective of individual
interests.19
17For the time being, B’s invitation is merely incidental. From the perspective of a knowing
outside observer (the designer) it looks as if B has just invented a central principle of legacy: rational
argumentation under public control! How is it possible to institutionalise B’s invention by simulating
repetition, recursion, confirmation and condensation?
18D and M have just invented a blackboard system (with procedural rules like sequential argu-
mentation) and what is more, they have enacted themselves as rudimentary mediators – a role that
will probably raise more expectations in the course of events when a certain agent is asked again and
again to be the mediator. In a large-scale scenario of many conflict forums occurring simultaneously,
a temporal common website should be evolving into a permanent common website not ”owned” by
a single agent but by the entire network.
19Yet another invention! They have just created a distinction between acceptable (social) and
unacceptable (individual) arguments: If the new distinction will be repeated, confirmed and specified
in coming episodes, this might eventually also change the general critera for exchanging linkages.
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i. Hence, the majority20 invites A to exchange linkages with them and A be-
comes a de facto participant of the network.
Excursion 4: Emergent structures again
At this point we must halt and try to understand some of the heroic assumptions im-
plied in our example. If we want to design an artificial social system which is able
to generate (almost ex nihilo) an emergent structure of ”due process” or reflexive
mediation with differentiated roles (mediator, jury), procedures of argumentation
(openness, evidence, sequentiality), standards of argumentation (normative justi-
fication instead of individual benefit), public obligation (commitment to majority
decision) etc., B’s suggestion (as in steps e. and f.) to include and henceforth
publicly address all other agents (instead of just privately addressing a collection
of acquainted agents, as in steps b., c., d.) must become more than an episode. It
must be confirmed and specified, reconfirmed and respecified again and again in a
very time consuming (if not: endless!) process of recursion. In the footnotes to the
previous example we have identified some crucial inventions (or: contingent varia-
tions) and the question is: How is it possible that such ”inventions” will crystallise
into social structure in subsequent conflict episodes, if contingent variation and dis-
continuity is much more likely than repetition and recondensation? Again, it is all
too easy and all too tempting at this point just to implement a pre-given structure
that invisibly shapes and controls the course of collective action and communica-
tion, thus directing the agent society onto a prescribed evolutionary track.
Take, for instance, the point at which the majority decides in favour of A and B
against C(step g.): Our agents might as well have voted in favour of C by explicat-
ing and accepting his implicit argument that the network’s general goal is to sup-
port subcultural mutuality and self-organisation among small enterprises (”small is
beautiful”) and keep ”big players” like A out of the community; or that A’s com-
mitment to the community values is doubtful because he has too many ”foreign
affairs” outside the network (evidence: A has many linkage liaisons with influ-
ential websites outside the network community). Moreover, the rationality of an
argument may change over time: What is good for the network community at one
20The next step would be to institutionalise the majority principle according to which the minority
is obliged to accept (not to act against or obstruct) majority decisions.
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time, namely openness to new ”members”21 with rapid growth to gain more in-
fluence in a turbulent environment (evidence: ones own network is much smaller
than other comparable ones), might be wholly threatening in a different situation
where the network is too big and heterogeneous to maintain its integrity. Or we
might envisage a situation which is framed by two different emergent belief sys-
tems or generalised media (on one side a small-is-beautiful communitarianism, and
an aggressive commercial orientation dominated by big business on the other: cf.
footnote 12).
Excursion 5: Performance (”fast motion”) versus evolution
(”slow motion”)?
In the preceding episode of a conflict communication we have demonstrated in
”fast motion” what is actually a very slow and time consuming process of evolu-
tionary learning. What we would need instead is a ”slow motion” computational
simulation to make an artificial social system evolve in a sociologically more ad-
equate manner. Hence, what we will need is a computational experiment running
on a permanent basis instead of one of the usual short-term simulations which are
able to hand out instant results to an impatiently waiting audience. Furthermore
we need to elaborate a completely new concept of what may be called emergent
”turning points” of learning or evolution: from individual invention to collective
innovation, from collective innovation to institutionalisation and vice versa. From
an engineering methods point of view such prospects do not look very appealing
though, since software engineering methods are developed to obtain high efficiency
and high speed at low costs. However, we contend that a very slow social system
which is gradually building up and maintaining and modifying an emergent social
structure could be efficient and fast from a ”top down” perspective: If we consider
a large society of many different network communities operating in parallel, these
might be able to learn from each other at ”fast motion” speed. While building a
social structure from scratch usually takes ages, a network community adopting or
21Here is another issue which needs clarification: openness, closure, membership. Our example
shows that, while the network community begins to engage in a collective discourse, the conflict is
not simply about an agent A being adopted by and into a network community or not. Rather it reveals
that the big story behind the little episode is about maintaining network identity when two different
networks are merging, namely B’s acquaintances and A’s acquaintances. Or is it not a merger but
just a one-point-liaison between two networks? But what is a network anyway?
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importing proven concepts developed elsewhere would not necessarily have to wait
for evolution. What we would need to elaborate, then, is a vision of two (or more)
different time scales: a bottom level of high inertia which is slowly reproducing a
social structures and a task-force level operating at high speed to cope with critical
situations, and, this is the decisive point, which is able to do so because it can feed
on resources provided by the slow-motion level. While the task-force level should
meet engineering standards of efficiency, the bottom-line level should comply with
engineering standards of robustness.
8 Interagent (”micro”) and network (”macro”) arguments
Coming back from the distant vision of an artificial social system meeting soci-
ological as well as software engineering requirements to the more immediate de-
mands of designing a more simple multiagent system, we would need to elaborate
further mechanisms and facilities to organise conflict forums, such as permanent
blackboards (whiteboards) and institutionalised roles for mediators, specific calls
for mediation and a closure procedure to prevent chaos and to organise the progress
of collective inquiry, deliberation, argumentation, prompt conclusion, and to pro-
duce a binding outcome (majority decision). A majority decision has far-reaching
implications. Agents must bear the consequences of autonomous action. As a so-
cial structure evolves, it would gradually reduce the consequences of individual
action without restricting agent autonomy ex ante. Thus, indirectly, conflict parties
just as all other agents involved in a conflict forum must commit themselves to the
majority decision, whatever its outcome, which includes collective ”deleteLink”
sanctions against anybody who acts against a majority decision. Again, such a tool
would largely have to rely on the set of basic actions and communication primitives
that have been defined above.
Quite difficult to handle, specifically from a computational perspective, are ”rea-
sons” or arguments. Reasons seem to require a sophisticated semantic elaboration
and must be disclosed and explicated and weighed in a complicated procedure of
operationalisation and parametrisation. Going through a mediation and negotia-
tion procedure conflict parties must reconstruct their conflict history, analyse the
patterns of escalation, analyse their reasons and motives and suggest and test out
different solutions. Agents therefore will have to be endowed with specific reason-
ing capacities beyond the scope of ”just” relinking and delinking themselves from
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and to others. In order to avoid excessive semantics, we must try to find a rigor-
ously simplified answer to this problem. In the course of forum evolution it might
be convenient to include due process level arguments such as a specific ”order of
interaction” (polite, civilised, obliging) or a more differentiated system of expec-
tations and sanctions than just ”insertLink” and ”deleteLink”. Or it would perhaps
be interesting to introduce a direct and more comprehensive website rating with
criteria like professional appearance, information content, consumer attractiveness
etc. But this looks far too complicated and would not add very much to the basic of
an evolutionary structure. Therefore, an rigorously simplified reasoning semantics
will not consist of more than three types of reasoning semantics both at a ”micro”
and a ”macro” level.
At the ”micro” level of a linkage conflict an agent who is offered an exchange
of links by another agent must be able to reason about linkage prospects: about
the impacts on his personal business prospects (is the other agent a competitor
or a promoter?), on bilateral dependencies (is the other agent influential or non-
influential?), on value commitments and general belief systems (e.g. a kind of
self-sustaining subcultural communitarism versus a strict commercial orientation
– perhaps with an innate evolutionary tendency to transform the networks ”ideol-
ogy” from communitarianism to commercialisation through linkage conflicts and
shifting membership.22 Again: Without rigorously reducing the number of ”con-
tent variables” or criteria to a maximum of two or three, we would easily run into a
combinatorial explosion. So to make the scenario more tractable, we should intro-
duce the following three types of interagent level reasons (which we have already
drawn on in the previous example):
8.1 Interagent level arguments
1. support (promoter, competitor)23
22Prospects for evolutionary change: the ultimate criterion of commercialisation will be the intro-
duction of ”linkage auctions”, which would render linkage liaisons more stable and less disputable
because they have been paid for.
23Support: From reading A’s self-description B will have to judge whether A will support his
goals or must be regarded as a potential competitor. If this is too difficult to achieve, the input could
be supplied directly from the user or by an interface agent. If the argument is symmetric in the
eyes of both agents they would come to the same conclusion and their would be hardly any conflict.
However, a support criterion is all but unambiguous and, moreover, an agent should be able to shift
his concepts over time and circumstances, which gives rise to conflict and reorganisation.
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2. influence (traffic or number of clicks, active links, references or passive
links)24
3. value commitment (same, different)25
Interagent level arguments equip the agents with basic criteria for framing (evaluat-
ing) other websites together with an inferential capability to decide whether to pro-
pose (or reject) an exchange of linkages. By checking a website’s content (in using,
to begin with, an ordinal scale or low-level distinction, subcultural versus commer-
cial orientation for instance) and influence (number of hits per day: provided such
information is available), agents could reason about their individual advantages
and disadvantages in case of establishing liaisons. (High traffic website agents
will probably publish their traffic figures more readily in order to demonstrate their
influencial power, while low-traffic websites will not.). Indirectly, agents could
acquire information by checking the linkages from and to other websites and by
relying on the wisdom of others (acquaintances) – a rather resource consuming
procedure, as it seems.
The ”micro” interagent level should be distinguished from a ”macro” network com-
munity level with three different types of arguments (these have also been drawn
on in the previous example):
8.2 Network level arguments
4. size of network (too small, too big, growing or shrinking?)26
24Influence: This is a quite straightforward argument because influence can be measured at
cardinal-scale level. The problem arises from unreliable information sources. The only informa-
tion which can be checked immediately is the list of active links, while passive links and number of
clicks must be taken at face value. In principle, passive links could be followed up by checking the
websites which are mentioned in the active-links list, but this could be quite time consuming. Clicks
can not be checked at all, unless a website owner would allow foreign agents to monitor his pri-
vate communication. . . However, a website community network could introduce a rule which would
compel all website agents to subscribe to a standardised self-description. Making a self-description
obligatory should be compatible with community conventions. Again, these should not be hardwired
but emergent properties of network evolution.
25Value commitment: Is a website in line with the values and goals of the network community?
This touches the issue of cultural ”sameness” (fear of eroding community values, e.g. by excessive
commercialisation, versus fear of marginalisation), an issue which is rife with dissent rather than
bearing consensus.
26The question is: How do agents have access to ”global knowledge” of how many agents are
linked to the network, how has the network evolved in the past and where is its future development
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5. power relations (symmetric, asymmetric, checks and balances)27
6. heterogeneity (same, different, differentiation/integration)28
On the level of collective reflection the ”macro” impact of a conflict on collective
regulations of the network community can be analysed with regard to network size
(is the network too large and, accordingly, social relationships too anonymous to
support internal solidarity?), cultural integration (too foreign, too heterogeneous?),
network influence onto the outside world (too marginal to influence the environ-
ment?), and democratic standards (asymmetric power relations?).
Introducing network level arguments, however, is incompatible with a bottom-up
approach unless agents are endowed with ”global knowledge”. To reason about the
advantages and disadvantages of a linkage liaisons and linkage conflicts from the
overall perspective of general network prospects without global network knowl-
edge is impossible. Global network knowledge would consist of an overall picture
about the empirical network structures together with some rudimentary theoretical
knowledge about the impact of different types of networks (star, circle, line) and
their possible combinations, about meta-networks and network boundaries, about
closure and saturation, and above all: about the risks and advantages of evolution-
ary network transformation and differentiation for the participants. Of course, in
principle it is possible that all available local knowledge can be brought and puz-
zled together (based on ”tell”, ”check”, ”insertLink” operations) to form a compre-
hensive or synthetic picture of a network’s liaison structure at a particular point in
time. But is it realistic to implement such a resource consumptive method of build-
ing global knowledge? And could it be justified on the grounds of sociological
adequacy?
going to, if we generally assume that their knowledge is reduced to what theys know about there
acquaintances?
27The same question: How do agents know about the asymmetric power distribution within the
network and from where do they get the preferences or criteria in favour of more or less symmetric
or asymmetric, more democratic, egalitarian etc. network structure? Are such different preferences
emergent properties and could they be subjected to open conflict or inquiry into inquiry?
28How much heterogeneity is a network able to support without breaking into different fractions
of value communities or sub-societies?
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9 Desiderata and open issues
As it seems, deriving a first paper version of a rather complex model of network
formation and collective conflict processing out of a minimum of speech-act like
communications, is not altogether impossible. However, several issues remain un-
resolved: How are agents able to reason on linkage exchange and coalition for-
mation at the ”local” interagent level; how and on what grounds do they decide
whether to exchange a link or not, whether to join a coalition or not; how can
they reason about the outcome of linkages, conflicts, and coalitions at the ”global”
level of a network; and what renders stability or continuation (i.e. structure) to
any coalition or any linkage in the face of agent autonomy and contingent interac-
tion? Moreover, how are linkage liaisons embedded within the empirical context of
webside-owners in modern society, how can they respond to the needs of a modern
society when agents look like tribal warlords calling their followers to the arms
on the basis of kinship affiliation and face-to-face interaction? Does our scenario
embody something like feudal commitments rather than modern social behaviour?
On one hand, grounding conflict coalitions on ”feudal” (or rather: communitar-
ian) obligation for and trust in mutual assistance seems to be quite plausible with
regard to modern subcultural communities rooted in today’s reality of modern so-
cieties. On the other hand, when agents are endowed with the autonomous right
to say no and to join and accept or to refuse and reject any commitment at any
time, the scenario is far from any modern social reality too. This is so because we
have not solved the basic dilemma of the bottom-up approach: generating emergent
frames of interaction (i.e. normative structures, repeated patterns of interaction) is
not warrented by strong agent autonomy. Granting autonomous decision making
to the individual agent harshly collides with the fact that we must presuppose an
autonomy which is tacitly controlled by procedures and standards for legitimate
argumentation, power, influence, values. . .
From a software engineering point of view things do not seem to look much better,
perhaps. Chaotic oscillation29 at run-time behaviour is imminent unless we assume
that our agents A and B dispose over some legitimate power to oblige others, un-
29Note that notions like ”fluidity” and ”variation” should not be easily excluded from further con-
sideration because of alleged non-computability. Instead, they should be considered more seriously
than this would be done from an engineering perspective. Something like ”chaotic oscillation” (or at
least a functional equivalent) should be considered particularly because interaction and communica-
tion are rather slow – not to speak of structural social change! – compared to cognitive operations.
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less we assume predefined roles, some global knowledge at everybody’s disposal
etc. If not: What might increase the probability that other agents will readily follow
A’s suggestions? And why not B’s? And who is the maverick anyway? A or B?
If everybody is free to link him – or herself to others or not, there is no moral or
legal obligation in the first place. If everybody could thwart anybody else’s plans
at any time, such prospects normally would not be considered as an invitation to
coordinated action or socially structured behaviour anyway. The question, then,
is how coordination is possible under the precondition that all agents are endowed
with equal autonomy. Since unlimited agent autonomy in an open website-network
scenario will yield unstructured linkage conflicts and produce chaotic behaviour
(or social entropy), we will have to introduce (or impose) some sort of restrictions.
Moreover, if each agent follows its own prerogative, it is unlikely that others should
be willing to form a coalition with A, unless we assume some preconditioned mu-
tuality (if A is ready to assist C,D,E . . . in their particular cases they will assist
A in his case. . .). Moreover A will not begin to escalate a conflict if he does not
have good reasons to believe that his case is going to be supported by a sufficient
number of others. Again, on what grounds? Somehow, his case will have to be
justified by some basic values, norms or principles or a volont generale which mo-
tivates potential supporters to join a coalition.
We assume that CONSTRUCT models or architectures differ from more conven-
tional DAI applications not only because they operate on a permanent basis (cf.
computational ecology) and that they produce, reproduce and modify an ”emer-
gent” social structure while resolving (or not resolving!) conflictive episodes. The
presumed advantages of the proposed model, both from a software engineering and
from a sociological perspective, should be seen in the way that a CONSTRUCTNET-
WORK would have to meet the demands of shifting from a highly efficient and cost
saving routine mode into a resource consumptive conflict mode and back again
into a new routine mode after the conflict has been settled. In other words: the
system should be able to learn from conflicts and, in doing so, an agent society
would operate like a self-organising mechanism or a non-trivial machine or a self-
sustaining general purpose infrastructure. As a self-restoring and self-modifying
infrastructure it must maintain a history file of its own conflict episodes. And it
would need some neural-network like mechanisms to re-enforce frequently used
patterns of interaction, conflict resolution, due process, ”emergent” conventions
etc. In order to built such a system, a first prototype should perhaps be restricted to
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learning just a minimum of core conventions. For instance, an agent society could
learn by conflict mediation that ”idiosyncratic” justifications at the interagent level
are gradually replaced by ”generalised” justification at the network level – in anal-
ogy to the pragmatist intuition (in line with Mead and Dewey, cf. [Mead, 1930, pp.
412], [Habermas, 1992, pp. 224], [Honneth, 1998]) that ”particular” standards of
justification are more and more replaced by ”universal” democratic standards.
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